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INTRODUCTION
Recognizing malicious programs is the objective of researchers in the software
security community. Unfortunately, though, this community is being relentlessly
challenged by authors of malicious programs using a variety of increasingly
sophisticated techniques for thwarting recognition. One of these techniques is code
morphing, which may transform any possibly recognizable shape or malicious
behavior of the program into a new one. Fast and accurate methods for recognizing
malware that uses code morphing are urgently needed.
1.1. Motivation
A morphing engine M is a program that has the ability to transform a program
written in some language into another program written in the same language. The
generated program is ordinarily a working program that may or may not have the
same functionality as the input program. The generated program itself is
transformable by the morphing engine, giving rise to generations of M-descendants
of a given program.
The term malware refers to malicious software such as viruses, worms, and
Trojans. Malware writers have implemented a number of morphing engines to
automatically transform malware code [1]. Such malware is called morphing
malware. Morphing engines that are attached to the code they are intended to
	

 

Figure 1.1. Metamorphic malware spreading modiﬁed copies of its code.
transform are also called metamorphic engines [1]. Malware that uses a
metamorphic engine to transform its own code is called metamorphic malware.
Figure 1.1 gives a pictorial representation of a malware’s variant spreading across a
network; each variant has a morphing engine attached to it (as a set of
subprocedures) that it uses to change its appearance or behavior as it replicates.
The notion of generations of descendants is also illustrated: VARIANT 3 is a
third-generation descendant of EVE but a ﬁrst-generation descendant of VARIANT
2.

	

 

Figure 1.2. Morphing engine spreading morphed malware.
2Figure 1.2 gives a pictorial representation of a “remote” morphing engine
transforming malware variants and sending them across a network. None of these
variants has attached to it a (possibly modiﬁed) copy of the engine.
In the remainder of this dissertation, the term engine will refer to a morphing
engine. The term Eve will refer to a malware variant whose descendants we wish to
detect. The phrase engine variant set will refer to the set of all malware variants
that an engine may output. In other words, the variant set of a morphing engine is
the set of all of the possible evolutions of a malware code using the engine.
A malware detector (often referred to as a “virus scanner”) is a program that
specializes in determining whether or not its input program is malicious. Frequently,
malware detectors implement functionality that identiﬁes malicious behavior that
has never been observed before. A malware detector normally will also implement
the functionality needed to recognize a malicious code description or behavior it has
previously been exposed to. Morphing engines challenge this goal: they produce
descendants of their input malware variant whose appearance or behavior is
diﬀerent from that of the variant. Automation in producing malware variants is
becoming more prevalent as a way of attacking malware detectors. Figure 1.3 shows
the sharp increase in the number of unique malware variants over the last two years,
much of which is known to be morphed [2].
The challenge then is for the malware detector to eﬃciently, and with a
suﬃciently small rate of false verdicts, decide membership in the variant set of M.
Various methods and scanning tools have been developed to address this challenge,
3Figure 1.3. Rise in the numbers of malware variants. Source: AV TestLabs [2].
in the context of metamorphic malware. These methods and tools, which remain
valid for general morphing engines, are discussed in detail in Chapter 2. In
particular, we show that these tools are severely limited in what they can possibly
guarantee in eﬃciently and reliably carrying out their tasks, which leaves
individuals, organizations, and entire economies at risk.
1.2. Contribution
We propose a new model for detecting morphed malware. This model requires that
a malware detector uses information about a morphing engine to recognize its
variant set. We propose new eﬃcient, approximate detection methods for morphed
malware which are based on this model. In addition, it is shown that
implementation of the requirements of good design practices of morphing malware
(GDPs) by any given morphing engine makes our methods more accurate in
deciding membership in the engine’s variant set.
4We also show that exact and eﬃcient recognition of morphed malware
variants–even given input-output access to its GDP-implementing engine–is
computationally costly. Then, and based on insights from good design practices of
morphing malware, we present a probabilistic model of morphing malware. Next,
and based on this model, approximate tools for detecting an engine’s variant set are
proposed. These tools use a morphing engine’s model to predict certain key features
of the variant set of the engine and of the various generations of descendants of a
given Eve. Finally, we design and present experiments showing that the proposed
tools successfully and eﬃciently discriminate, in an approximate sense, members of
the engine’s variant set from programs that have not been output by the engine.
1.3. Impact
Using eﬃcient, approximate recognition tools for variants sets of GDP-implementing
morphing engines is expected to assist existing malware detectors in the following
two main ways.
1. Corner writers of morphing malware. The malware recognition methods
proposed and evaluated in this dissertation speciﬁcally aim to recognize
variant sets of those powerful engines that attempt to thwart detection by
current malware detectors. More speciﬁcally, the methods are designed so that
their accuracy increases as more GDPs are implemented by morphing
malware. Should the malware not implement GDPs, it leaves itself open to
detection by current detection technologies.
52. Make existing malware detectors more eﬃcient. The malware recognition
methods proposed and evaluated in this dissertation are eﬃcient and may be
used as detectors or as decision-support tools for modern malware detectors,
enabling them to determine whether or not they need to run potentially costly
program analysis algorithms on a suspect program. In other words, these
methods provide existing malware detectors with a fast way of ﬁltering out
programs that cannot possibly belong to the variant set of a given morphing
engine.
Figure 1.4 gives a pictorial representation of where tools implementing our
proposed detection methods ﬁt in the overall process of analyzing malware. They
can be viewed as detectors or as eﬃcient ﬁlters that provide a malware detector with
evidence suggesting whether or not to run potentially time-consuming algorithms on
a program suspected of belonging to the variant set of a given morphing engine.
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Figure 1.4. Using its engine to detect morphed malware.
61.4. Organization
Chapter 2 motivates our proposed approximate method and tools of morphed
malware variants. The state-of-the-art of malware detection technology and research
are examined and their limitations exposed.
Chapter 3 proposes a formal model of morphing malware that is inspired by our
study of what constitutes good design pratices of morphing malware (GDPs). Using
this model, several exact recognition problems of a morphing engine’s variant set are
shown to be NP-complete, and hence computationally costly. Arguments are made
for the need to devise approximate solutions that use information about the engine
of a GDP-implementing malware to decide membership in the engine’s variant set.
Chapter 4 introduces and evaluates an approximate approach to solving the
hard problem of exactly recognizing the variant set of a GDP-implementing
instruction-substituting morphing engine. The approach is successfully evaluated on
variants of the W32.Evol metamorphic virus.
Chapter 5 introduces and evaluates an instruction-distribution-based method
that predicts the average instruction frequency distribution of the various
generations of M-descendants of a given Eve,w h e r eM is some probabilistic
instruction-substituting morphing engine. The approach is successfully evaluated on
variants of the W32.Evol metamorphic virus.
Conclusions are made and directions for further work are proposed in Chapter 6.
7CHAPTER 2
THE PROBLEM OF RECOGNIZING MALWARE VARIANTS
In this chapter we examine the general problem of recognizing malware variants.
First, we survey code morphing transformations that have been used by morphing
engines. Then we describe the techniques implemented by state-of-the-art malware
detectors to recognize variants of morphing malware. Next, the current state of the
research on (1) formal modeling of morphing malware and (2) recognizing malware
variants is examined. The fundamental limitations of both existing technologies and
research are then exposed.
The transformations and detection tools discussed in this chapter speciﬁcally
relate to semantics-preserving metamorphic engines, i.e., malware-carried morphing
engines. However, they are immediately applicable in the general case where the
engine is not necessarily carried by the malware. Extensions of the covered
transformations to include non-semantics-preserving ones can also be easily derived
by simply ignoring the conditions under which a transformation preserves semantics.
2.1. Morphing Transformations
Many source-to-source program transformations can be used (or combined) by a
morphing engine to transform a malware variant’s code [1]. A number of these
transformations came to be understood thanks to analyses by people in the
anti-malware research community [3], [4], [1]; others were simply advertised byauthors of morphed malware [5], [6], [7]. These transformations include code
substitution, garbage insertion, register renaming, code permutation, and expression
reshaping. Figure 5.3 shows an example involving these transformations. It should
be noted that any number of other transformations are possible. However,
preference has been given by malware writers to (1) code substitution
transformations, which replace certain code segments with other code segments, and
(2) garbage insertion transformations, which insert random code segments and
do-nothing code segments at certain points in the code being transformed [1]. These
types of morphing transformations are described below.
• Code Substitution. As its name implies, a code substitution transformation
replaces certain segments in the code that are to be transformed with others.
This is typically done by means of a set of transformation rules of the form
l → r,w h e r el, the left hand side of the rule and r, its right hand side, are two
typically equivalent code segments. A morphing engine’s rule set is usually
carried by the engine [1]. Transforming a malware variant involves scanning it
(in some kind of, usually linear, fashion), looking for some instance of a left
hand side l. If one is found, the engine replaces it with its corresponding right
hand side r, if the substitution may not corrupt the intended overall behavior
of the program. Once this is determined, the engine may probabilistically
decide to proceed with the replacement. Examples of such engines include
that of W32.Evol and W32.Simile. W32.Simile is also known as Metaphor or
W32.Etap [5].
9• Garbage Insertion. Any program transformation that inserts code in a
program while guaranteeing that the input/output behavior of the program is
not altered is a garbage inserting transformation. Clearly, there may be more
than one way of implementing this transformation. A morphing engine may,
for example, compute the control ﬂow graph of its input program and add a
random code block in an unreachable control path, which is a path connecting
the entry node of a program’s CFG to its exit node. Such a control path may
be part of the program or it may be introduced by the engine using an opaque
predicate, one that (1) may always return TRUE, FALSE, or either, and (2)
whose computed function cannot be learned statically, or is prohibitively
costly to learn statically [8]. Note that “garbage” in this case includes both
the unreachable code block and the inserted opaque predicate. An engine may
also randomly insert sequences of do-nothing instructions in any given
single-entry single exit code block of its input program [9]. We note, in
particular, that some engines choose to implement garbage insertion as a code
substitution transformation where the rules are carried by the engine. For
example, one code substituting transformation rule used by W32.Evol
substitutes occurences of the push eax instruction with the (semantically
non-equivalent) sequence push eax; add eax,0. This transformation
eﬀectively inserts a garbage (do-nothing) code segment after a push eax.T h e
instruction add eax,0 is considered garbage in this particular case, as far as
register eax is concerned, and ignoring the side-eﬀect of an add instruction on
10the carry ﬂag, because W32.Evol’s Eve and transformation rules are designed
such that any of this virus’ variants satisfy the property “immediately after
each push eax instruction, register eax is not live” [9].
• Register Renaming. As implied by its name, this transformation replaces
certain register names with others, usually provided that the operational
semantics of the program being transformed are not altered. This may, of
course, be achieved by simply “shuﬄing” the registers used throughout the
program being transformed. If the register renaming is local to an instruction
or a code segment within the program, additional care needs to be taken: an
instruction such as mov eax, val, which stores value val into register eax,
may be replaced with mov ebx,val only provided that it is a safe
transformation, that is, only if the instruction is dead and ebx holds val.T h i s
may be achieved by a costly def-use analysis and extraction of the liveness
information of the registers used in the program. The liveness computation
step may also be skipped by preserving liveness and def-use properties of a
select number of registers across malware variants or by placing special
markers holding the names of the register that are not live at the marked
program point and which may hence be used in the renaming process. These
“tricks” have been successfully implemented by the Miss Lexotan virus [9].
• Code Permutation. Permutation reorders code that is not order-dependent.
This transformation can be computationally costly, especially if the engine
11preserves semantics and requires that code segments be swapped (without
necessarily being reconnected using unconditional branch instructions) only
provided that the original control ﬂow is not aﬀected. This is done by
ensuring that there are no control or data dependencies between the segments
being swapped and that instructions pointing to these segments are updated
accordingly to point to the new locations. W32.Simile is an example of an
engine performing this transformation, as well as others, by keeping track of
pairwise control dependencies among instructions to assist the transformation
process [9].
• Expression Reshaping. Compared to the ones above, this is a rather “simple”
transformation; it generates new expressions to compute the value returned by
the expression being reshaped [10]. The expression (y+z)
2 may, for example,
be reshaped into the equivalent expression y
2+2*y*z+z
2. This transformation
suﬀers the limitation of not altering the control ﬂow of the code being
transformed, leaving the malware vunerable to behavioral signature scanning.
An expression reshaping transformation may also be implemented by a
morphing engine as a code substitution transformation. This choice has been
made by the W32.Simile virus [5].
A number of malware detection methods have been proposed and implemented over
the years to improve the ability of malware detectors to detect morphed malware
variants [9], citeSzor2005, [11]. The primary goal of techniques based on these
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Figure 2.1. Examples of morphing transformations.
methods is to be able to quickly detect “most” variants of the malware while being
allowed to have only a “very small” rate of false verdicts, that is, to ensure that only
a small percentage of actual variants are identiﬁed as non-variants and vice versa.
Particular emphasis is often placed on reducing the number of false negatives, where
a scanner fails to recognize a malware variant as one. The following section
describes these methods and exposes their limitations.
2.2. Existing Work
Existing work on the recognition of morphed malware variants can be categorized as
formal treatments and practical treatments.
132.2.1.Formal Treatments
The ﬁrst mathematical model of an evolving computer virus (morphing malware)
was constructed by Cohen [12]. In this model, given a Turing machine (TM) M,a
set V of TM sequences is a viral set for M if, on input v ∈ V , M eventually writes
v
  ∈ V , i.e., a possible “evolution” of v, somewhere on its tape and far enough away
from v so that there is no overlap. Spinellis later used this model to show that there
exist evolving viruses such that the problem of recognizing their descendants is NP
complete [13]. Chess and White [14] also used Cohen’s model to show that general
decision of membership in viral sets in which any member of the set is
transformable into any member of the set is unsolvable. Other models of evolving
viruses have also been proposed by Adleman [15] and later by Bonfante et al. [16].
These models represent evolving viruses as recursive functions, which are just as
powerful as computational models of algorithms as Turing machines [17]. Using
these latter models, a number of non trivial sub-problems of that of recognizing
malware variants were once again shown to be computationally costly. A
comprehensive survey of mathematical treatments of evolving viruses, using the TM
and the recursive function formalisms, can be found in [11].
Morphing engines have been modeled as formal grammars as far back as 1999 in
an online magazine for malware writers [7]. More recent work by Filiol [18] has
modeled morphing engines as unrestricted grammars. He classiﬁes morphing engines
as type 0, 1, 2, and 3 grammars, based on Chomsky’s unrestricted, context sensitive,
context free, and regular grammars, respectively. Filiol then proceeds to explore the
14existence and type of automata that could be used to recognize the languages
generated by each type of grammar. He shows that, while type 3 languages and
type 2 languages are decidable in polynomial time using their corresponding
grammars, type 1 languages are NP-complete and type 0 languages are undecidable.
This motivates the need for alternate, perhaps approximate, approaches to deciding
membership in type 0 and type 1 languages.
None of the existing models of malware evolution mechanisms (i.e., Turing
machines, recursive functions, and grammars) require the transformation process to
be eﬃcient or take into account the relative transformability by the engine of one
program compared to another. Transformability of a program P here means that
the engine is capable of generating, on input P, a program whose description is
diﬀerent from that of P. Furthermore, prior work (except for that of Spinellis [13])
does not address the complexity of constructing an engine-aware detector for
malware variants. An engine-aware detector is a program that can, given
input/output access to a morphing engine, decide membership in the variant set of
the engine. Moreover, prior work does not address the complexity of deciding
membership in the set of a given generation of M-descendants of a malware variant,
where M is a morphing engine.
2.2.2.State of the Technology
Modern malware detectors use a variety of program analysis techniques as tools to
assist in the recognition of malware variants.
15These techniques fall under one or both of the two following categories.
1. The detector statically analyzes the suspect program for the presence of some
byte pattern known to implement some given malicious behavior or known to
be part of the code of some known malware variant [1].
2. The detector dynamically analyzes the suspect program in an emulator or
sandbox and monitors its behavior hoping to catch any unexpected behavior
or known malicious behavior, such as a sequence of call instructions known to
be routinely used by some malware variant [4].
Two major detection models of malware variants have emerged: the traditional
“malware signatures” detection model and the more recent “generic signatures”
detection model.
Malware Signatures
A “known byte pattern,” as well as a “known malicious behavior,” used to detect
occurences of a malware variant is referred to as a signature for that variant. This
traditional model for detecting malware, a pictorial description of which is given in
Figure 2.2, is hence referred to as the malware signature detection model. For
example, Christodorescu et al. [19] have reported that the byte pattern signature
used by the Norton Antivirus for the Chernobyl/CIH virus is the hexadecimal
sequence E800 0000 005B 8D4B 4251 5050 0F01 4C24 FE5B 83C3 1CFA 8B2B
that corresponds to the following IA-32 code segment known to be part of this
virus’ code.
16E800000000 call 0h
5B pop ebx
8D4B42 lea ecx, [ebx + 42h]
51 push ecx
50 push eax
50 push eax
0F014C24FE sidt [esp - 02h]
5B push ecx
83C31C add ebx, 1Ch
FA cli
8B 2B mov ebp, [ebx]
The malware signature model was actually not designed to speciﬁcally solve the
problem of recognizing morphed malware variants. The original use of a malware
signature is to recognize identical instances of a malware variant that does not use a
morphing engine to transform its code or behavior. For morphing malware, a
regular expression may be used to encode sections of the malware that do not
change as the malware evolves. We categorize this detection detection technique
under the generic detection model of malware (discussed further below).
Malware signatures of this sort are typically generated by malware-analysts in
anti-virus laboratories. Though statistical techniques have been proposed to
automate the extraction of virus signatures [20], this process typically involves
having one or more lab workers analyze some suspect program [1]. If the program is
found to be malicious, the analysts manually, and based on their experience with
malware, decide what behavioral or byte pattern to use as a signature for the
malware. The laboratory’s malware detector’s signature database is then updated
17and then used to declare as malware any program having that pattern. This
database update is later distributed and uploaded to the detectors running on the
machines of subscribing customers.
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Figure 2.2. Malware signature model.
For behavioral signatures, this model can remain insensitive to morphing
transformations which perfectly preserve the behavior (e.g., sequence of system
calls) used as a signature and extracted from a single instance of the malware [1].
Generic Signatures
The recent sharp increase in the number of malware variants seen in the wild (See
Figure 1.3) has led anti-virus companies to consider using generic signatures to
detect families of malware variants [1]. A generic signature is any byte pattern or
malicious behavior, extracted by human anti-virus analysts, that is expected to
enable the malware detector to decide whether a suspect program is a member of
the set of variants of a given malicious programs or of manually and slightly
“altered” versions of a known malicious programs. Let v denote a variant of a
morphing malware that uses a morphing engine M to transform its code. A regular
expression encoding the sequences of bytes in v that M does not change is an
example of a generic signature for the M-descendants of v.
18Limitations
A signature may be syntactic (such as a byte pattern) or behavioral (such as a
sequence of call instructions that could be executed at run time). Morphing engines
that completely transform their input program’s appearance or behavior, for
example, challenge modern detection technologies [1].
The use of one unique signature per malware variant, while quite popular among
major vendors of malware detectors, has limitations that become severe when
presented with the task of accurately and quickly recognizing variants sets of
powerful morphing engines. Powerful morphing engines are both eﬃcient and
eﬀective. That is, the transformation process happens quickly to ensure fast
propagation–in the case of network worms, for example. The transformation process
is also expected to be capable of generating, from any given variant, an
unmanageable number of variants each of which bearing little resemblence, if any, to
the variant from which it was generated.
This is true, in particular, of instruction-substituting engines whose rule sets are
capable of randomly transforming any instruction in the instruction set of the
computing platform that the malware is intended to run on (e.g., IA-32). Storing a
signature for each malware variant, especially if no two variants have the same
signature, quickly becomes a major resource-consuming activity. Sending out virus
signatures to update the virus deﬁnitions stored on computers running a
malware-signature based detector has to happen at least as fast as the engine
generates a new variant or the detector will fall behind. Moreover, typical computer
19users are usually not very receptive to the idea of having to wait while their huge
malware signature databases are updated or searched through to determine whether
the benign ﬁle they are opening or downloading is a variant of some known
morphing malware when it is not.
Techniques that run a suspect program in an emulator and monitor for speciﬁc
malicious behaviors are limited as well. Morphing malware may attack such
techniques by using anti-emulation tricks, such as making a new variant take the
malicious path only rarely, prepending a million-iteration do-nothing loop to a new
variant’s code, or changing the behavior used by malware detectors to recognize its
variants [1].
Modern malware detectors almost always rely on a case-by-case manual analysis
of individual engines and are mostly useful only for the detection of program
generated by morphing engines which insert constant markers in the generated
program [4]. These techniques are also known to have suﬀered high numbers of false
positive and false negative rates due to their lack of a systematic way of extracting
provably good signatures [1]. Furthermore, good design practices of morphing
malware, discussed in Section 3.2, typically require that any byte in a morphing
malware’s binary be transformable by the morphing engine [5]. It seems then
reasonable to expect writers of morphing malware to produce malware all of whose
bytes are transformable by the engine. Any detection technique using a constant
byte pattern as a signature for detecting all of the variants of such malware will fail
to reliably accomplish their goal.
20No sound arguments have been made to prove the general accuracy of most of
the “generic signatures” that are used by commercial malware detectors. Instead,
serious concerns have been expressed by both anti-virus companies and users of
software products suggesting that many commercial malware detectors have been
responsible for high rates of false positives, declaring as malicious such programs as
Microsoft’s Windows Explorer(See Krebs [21]). Krebs also reports that commercial
malware detectors have also been responsible for high rates of false negative:
Jerry Dixon, director of analysis for Team Cymru, a security research ﬁrm in
Burr Ridge, Ill., said his team recently submitted more than 1,000 samples of
brand new malware for scanning by 32 diﬀerent commercial anti-virus products
from around the globe. The result: Only 37 percent of the programs were
detected as malicious by any of the products.
2.2.3.State of the Research
We now discuss relevant research eﬀorts, both industrial and academic, aimed at
devising methods for improving the eﬃciency and accuracy of modern malware
detectors at detecting malware variants. Some of the proposed methods, such as the
use of malware phylogenies to model relationships among slightly modiﬁed malware
variants, assign programs to a given family of variants. One such method has been
developed by Karim et al. [22]. These methods, however, are not useful in the
particular case of morphing engines since these engines strive to make sure that any
similarities between two malware variants be removed each time a morphing engine
21transforms a variant. Hence, detection methods that assume slight variations in
malware evolutions will not be discussed any further.
A targeted survey of relevant methods for detecting morphed malware variants
is reported below.
Program Normalization
The Normalizer Construction Problem (NCP) [10] is the problem of constructing a
procedure to normalize morphed malware variants (possibly into a unique common
normal form) and use the normal form(s) to accurately detect all of the variants of
the malware; if the procedure reduces a suspect program to one of these normal
forms, or to one that is similar to it, the suspect program is declared a variant of
the malware. Such a normalizer would relieve the burden of having to maintain a
signature for each possible malware variant by using the smaller (and hopefully
tractable) set of normal forms as representative for the variant set. A complete
description of NCP can be found in [3]. A normalizer-based detection model of
morphing malware, a pictorial description of which is given in Figure 2.3, is one that
uses some (possibly approximate) solution to an instance of NCP to recognize the
variants of the malware. This model was applied to assist in the detection of (1) a
metamorphic malware that performs the variable renaming, expression reshaping
and instruction reordering transformation [10] and (2) a metamorphic malware
which performs the instruction substitution transformation [23]. It was also applied
by Bruschi et al. [24] and Christodorescu et al. [25], [26] to suggest that certain
22program normalization techniques, typically used by optimizing compilers, may be
helpful in normalizing variants of morphing malware regardless of the
semantics-preserving transformations it applies on its own code.
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Figure 2.3. Normalizer model.
Malware detection methods that are based on (approximately) solving NCP,
while perfectly sound, are not guaranteed to reduce, to a manageable value, the size
of the set all of the malware signatures needed to accurately detect all of the variants
of the malware. Lakhotia and Mohammed [10], for example, report a reduction in
the number of possible variants of a case study program from 10
183 to 10
20. While
this reduction in size is considerable, 10
20 normal forms is still too large a number of
unique signatures to store for practical purposes. The success of normalization
methods is usually strongly dependent upon that of the easily thwarted program
analysis techniques [27]. Normalization based on term rewriting is in general
undecidable [3]. Generic normalizers, such as those which apply general compiler
optimizations techniques (such as constant folding) in an attempt to “simplify” a
given suspect program to expose any known malicious pattern or behavior [24], can
also be thwarted using any of a number of resilient code obfuscations [27].
23Semantics-aware Analysis
Semantics-aware analysis methods for determining whether a suspect binary
implements some malicious behavior have recently been proposed. Most of these
methods use static program analysis techniques to determine whether the suspect
binary implements some known malicious behavior, without ever running the binary
in an emulator. Other methods proposed improvements on those that are based on
pure dynamic analysis of a suspect binary.
Kruegel et al. proposed a malware detection method that relies on the
construction of the full control ﬂow graph (CFG) of a disassembled binary. The
malware detector would render a verdict on suspect binary after measuring the
similarity of structure between the CFG of the suspect binary and that of a known
or suspected malicious control ﬂow graph [28]. Christodorescu et al. proposed a
detection method that, after extracting a suspect binary’s CFG, undoes speciﬁc
types of program obfuscations [19] if applied to the suspect binary and then looks
for a known malicious control ﬂow in the resulting simpliﬁed program. Later
works [29], [30], [31] proposed variations on this method that are targeted towards
undoing more elaborate program obfuscation techniques. Zhang and Reeves [32]
analyze a suspect binary by disassembling it, creating its CFG, and then using as a
signature a ﬂow of function calls known to be used by malware.
Some semantics-aware detection methods of malware are based on model
checking. They require that the detector be able to construct the full CFG of a
suspect binary and verify whether a certain malicious control path or data ﬂow is
24implemented by the CFG. Model checking for statically detecting malicious
behavior has been proposed by Singh and Lakhotia [33] and later successfully
evaluated on speciﬁc malware instances by Kinder et al. [34] and Holzer et al. [35].
An early paper by Bergeron et al. [36] proposed a hybrid detection method for
malicious binaries which combines static, dynamic, and model checking to
determine whether a suspect binary implements known malicious behavior. They
suggest a set of tools that they feel are worth evaluating on real malware variants.
Purely dynamic analysis-based methods for detecting malware include Moser et
al.’s software testing-based tool for extracting a behavioral malware signature [37].
They run a malicious program on a predeﬁned set of “interesting” inputs and, if a
certain malicious control path is taken, they use that input, along with the path, as
a signature for the malware. They successfully tested their method on samples from
diﬀerent malware families (slightly and manually altered versions of malware
instances). Bayer et al. proposed an emulator that does not change the program it
is emulating in order to keep the program from detecting that it is being
emulated [38]. This contribution addresses the challenge presented by malware that
behaves maliciously only after checking whether it is being emulated.
The static-analysis-based detection methods of malware suﬀer the severe
limitations of static program analysis discussed above. They are also easily defeated
by general program obfuscations and call obfuscation [39], in particular. Recent
work by Moser et al. [40] has constructed obfuscating transformations for binaries
that make it provably hard to extract the data ﬂow of the binary and hence render
25semantics-aware static detection tools useless to detect variants of obfuscated
malware that emoploys these transformations. The semantics-aware malware
detection methods assume preservation of ﬂow graphs and call structure during
mutation, which is not a safe assumption for our targeted malware.
Purely Statistical Methods
Kolter and Maloof [41] have proposed to adapt to the problem of detecting malware
a text classiﬁcation method that takes as input the binary of a suspect program,
extracts its 4-gram distribution and classiﬁes it against observed 4-grams of known
malicious and non malicious programs. They have tested their method using a
number of classiﬁcation tools, including Bayesian and Support Vector Machines. Li
et al. [42] have proposed a classiﬁcation method of malicious versus benign binaries
based solely on their 1-gram (i.e., byte) distributions. More recent purely statistical
methods for recognizing malicious programs have been proposed by Bilar [43,44].
His evaluation results suggest that the most rare of IA-32 opcodes may be a better
predictor of a malicious program than the most frequent ones.
While eﬃcient and not requiring correct disassembly of the program to be
analyzed, Kolter’s and Maloof’s method is not speciﬁc to any particular malware
family and may be thwarted by morphing. Li et al.’s method, while surprisingly
promising, and requiring only feature vectors of size 256, is not guaranteed to scale
for classifying malware families within all malicious programs. Bilar’s method
suﬀers the limitation that the distribution of the opcodes alone is not suﬃcient to
26satisfactorily accurately (i.e., with small rates of false positives and false negatives)
tell malicious programs belonging to a certain family from other programs.
2.2.4.Fundamental Limitations of Progam Analysis
The one main common limitation of all proposed detection methods, except for
those that are purely statistical, is due to their reliance on using algorithms for
statically analyzing assembly and high level language programs, as well as
dynamically analyzing executable programs [27], [40]. These are the algorithms that
specialize in such activites as disassembling binaries, constructing a program’s
control ﬂow graph, or performing certain data ﬂow analyses on a program’s control
ﬂow graph [27]. These tasks are often computationally intensive and sometimes
impossible (e.g., when attempting to decide the exact value returned by a
predicate). More to the point, if the detector needs to run for every program loaded,
any signiﬁcant computational overhead may be intolerable.
2.3. The Need for an Alternative Detection Approach
The above limitations of existing technology and research on malware detection,
and the fact that morphing engines are diﬃcult to write and tend to be reused,
typically by writing a new malicious program to be morphed by an existing engine,
suggest the usefulness of a detection model that uses information about a morphing
malware’s engine (transformation process) to detect variants of the malware by
deciding membership in the variant set of the engine. This is precisely the main
contribution of this dissertation.
27In order to circumvent the inherent limitations of static and dynamic program
analysis discussed above, alternative semantics-independent solutions to the
problem of detecting morphed malware variants are needed to overcome the
limitations of having to exactly solve unsolvable problems or eﬃciently solve
provably intractable problems. Since they ignore program behavior, these solutions
can be viewed as “ﬁltering tools” that could, with minimal to no program analysis
overhead, give some measure of likelihood that a suspect program could have been
output by a given morphing engine. For example, if a suspect program is “very
unlikely” to be a variant of some morphing malware, then searching a large malware
signature database, or running a normalizer on the program, is avoided. If the
program is a never-before-seen variant of which no signature exists in the detector’s
local database (or in any malware signature database for that matter), the ﬁltering
tool would recognize it as a probable variant and suggest the need for more costly
analysis. This set of solutions is exactly what we propose in this dissertation.
28CHAPTER 3
ATTRIBUTING MORPHED MALWARE TO ITS ENGINE
Existing works on the theory computer viruses model morphing malware as
“evolving viruses,” focusing on the computational complexity of detecting malware
variant [11], and considering execution properties only insofar that the
transformation process (engine) must eventually halt. This chapter models
morphing malware by taking into account several of what we determined to be good
design practices of morphing malware. The complexity aspects of the recognition of
a morphing engine’s variant set (i.e., malware evolutions) are then examined. In
particular, it is shown that, even given input/output (or black-box) access to its
morphing engine M, decision of membership in a given generation of M-descendants
of a malware variant is NP-complete. It is also shown that the following problem is
NP-complete: Recognize a sequence s as a morphed malware variant by taking the
sum of the sizes of non-overlapping engine-insertable subsequences of s, and return
is a variant if the ratio of this sum to the size of s is greater than or equal to some
a-priori ﬁxed value. The computational diﬃculty of these problems motivates the
need for alternative approximate procedures for solving them. These approximate
procedures are presented in subsequent chapters.3.1. Motivation
The model of morphing malware proposed here aims to reﬂect the informal notion
of “good design practices” of morphing malware, which will be discussed in the next
section. These are the practices typically followed by malware writers to achieve the
ultimate goal of malware morphing, which is to thwart detection by malware
detectors by considerably,a n deﬃciently, changing the appearance (code) or
malicious behavior of the malware. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect morphing
engines to be able to infect as many locations (ﬁles, computers, etc.) as possible in
as little time as possible: maximal infection rates are sought by parasitic malware
(i.e., computer viruses) and high network spreading speed is sought by computer
worms. A fast transformation step is then needed for infection to take place
eﬃciently.
While engine eﬃciency is the main characteristic not covered in existing formal
treatments of morphing malware, other requirements of good design practices of
morphing malware (GDPs) certainly need to be taken into account in modeling
morphing malware.
A discussion of GDPs is in order to shed further light on what are to be
considered as the key characteristics that enable morphing engines to seriously
challenge the existing detection tools of morphing malware.
303.2. Good Design Practices of Morphing Malware
As mentioned in Chapter 2, only a “handful” of program transformations have been
adopted over and over again by writers of morphing malware [1]. These
transformations are preferred by writers of morphing malware because they enable
them, with as small as possible time and space overhead, to challenge existing
malware recognition technologies. What we view as good design practices of
morphing malware are informally deﬁned below. These will be referred to as needed
in the remainder of this dissertation.
P1 (Engine eﬃciency.) Morphing engines operating on binary programs typically
expect to be able to correctly transform the binary without having to perform
potentially time-consuming static and dynamic program analyses on it [9]. We
view engine eﬃciency as a requirement of good design practices of morphing
malware since a fast transformation ensures fast propagation and potential
damage to an as large as possible number of target computing systems, and to
challenge malware detectors which use one signature per malware variant.
P2 (Non-deterministic computation.) On input a malware variant, a morphing
engine may choose to not transform the variant or to output a ﬁrst-generation
descendant of the variant that is not identical to the variant. A deterministic
morphing engine M does not present much of a challenge to malware detectors
since they can simply run it n times on an input Eve to get as output the only
n
th-generation M-descendant of Eve. Furthermore, the more alternate control
31paths that a non-deterministic engine can take, the more variants of any given
Eve can potentially be output in just one run of the eﬃcient engine.
P3 (High engine-friendliness of malware variants.) Informally speaking, given an
engine M, a malware variant is M-friendly if M is capable of transforming it
on at least one of its computations. Some measures of engine-friendliness are
formally deﬁned later in this chapter. A variant is said to be highly
engine-friendly if the size of the set of all of its M-descendants is expected to
challenge the storage resources of malware detectors which use the malware
signature detection model. The most straightforward measure of a malware
variant’s high engine-friendliness is that any instruction in the variant be
transformable by the engine [1]. We view high engine friendliness of malware
variants as a good design practice of morphing malware, since a highly
engine-friendly Eve of the malware may be transformed in a single, fast,
computation of the engine into any of a set of pairwise distinct sequences. One
may think of computers in a network each getting infected, in a short amount
of time, with a unique ﬁrst generation descendant of Eve.
P4 (High engine-friendliness preservation.) Diﬀerent measures for a variant’s
high engine-friendliness and for an engine’s high-friendliness preservation may
be deﬁned. An engine M is said to be high-engine-friendliness-preserving if all
of the M-descendants of a highly engine-friendly variant are at least as highly
engine-friendly as the variant. We view high engine-friendliness preservation
32as a requirement of good design practices of morphing malware by extension
of the argument made in P3:a n yM-descendants of a highly engine friendly
Eve can itself challenge the storage resources of malware detectors which use
the malware signature detection model
3.3. A Formal Model of Morphing Malware
A deﬁnition of morphing malware is proposed that captures the requirements of
good design practices of morphing malware outlined above.
3.3.1.Background and Notations
Since it is a simple yet powerful way of expressing non-determinism and eﬃcient
computation, we use the Turing machine as mathemetical model for the informal
notion of an algorithm. A nondeterministic Turing machine (NDTM) is a 6-tuple
M =( S,Σ,Γ,δ,s 0,h), where S is a ﬁnite set of states, Σ = {0,1} is the input
alphabet, Γ is the tape alphabet (Σ is a proper subset of Γ and there exists a
(blank) symbol  ∈Γ − Σ), s0 ∈ S is the start state, h/ ∈ S is a halt state, and
δ : S × Γ → 2
(S∪{h}×Γ×{←,→}) is the transition function, where ← and → encode the
directions (left or right, respectively) in which the tape’s RW head is to move, and,
2
X returns the power set of its argument set X. The machine also halts if, while at
some state s,i tr e a d sas y m b o lx such that δ is undeﬁned at (s,x). The machine
works with a tape that is unbounded to the right, bounded to the left, and each of
whose cells initially contains a  . The machine is always started at a designated
start state s0 with input  x  on the tape, and with the tape head pointing to the
33ﬁrst character of x. If and when the machine reaches its halt state h,i th a l t s ,w i t h
some  y  on its tape. A conﬁguration of M is a triple (tape contents to the left of
the RW head, current state, tape contents to the right of the RW head). A “yield”
relation   on conﬁgurations can hence be deﬁned. Let c and c
  denote two TM
conﬁgurations, then we write c   c
  if c
  encodes the current state of the machine and
its tape after one transition from c.L e t 
n represent exactly n applications of   and
 
∗ represent an arbitrary number of applications of  . An NDTM is said to run in
polynomial time if there exists a polynomial poly such that for all x ∈ Σ
∗, M always
halts in a number of steps that is less than or equal to poly(|x|). A more detailed
deﬁnition of an NDTM and of a polynomial-time NDTM can be found in [45].
3.3.2.Proposed Model
Now we present a mathematical model capturing the informal notion of morphing
engines discussed in Chapter 2. The ﬁrst three of what we view as requirements of
good design practices of morphing malware are captured by this deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Morphing Engine). A polynomial-time NDTM M is said to be a
morphing engine if there exist distinct v,v
  ∈ Σ
∗ such that ( ,s 0,v)  
∗ ( ,h,v
 ),
where ( ,s 0,v)a n d(  ,h,v
 ) are possible conﬁgurations of M.E v e r ys u c hv is
called an M-friendly sequence.
An example of a morphing engine follows.
34Example
The “bit ﬂipping engine” (BFE) is an example of a simple yet powerful morphing
engine that is able to transform any non-empty string. It is a Turing machine
(S,Σ,Γ,δ,s 0,h)w h e r eS = {s0,s 1},Γ={0,1},Σ={0,1, }, and the transition
function is given in Table 3.1.
(s,i) δ(s,i)
(s0,0) {(s0,0,→),(s0,1,→)}
(s0,1) {(s0,0,→),(s0,1,→)}
(s0, ) {(s1, ,←)}
(s1,0) {(s1,0,←)}
(s1,1) {(s1,1,←)}
(s1, ) {(h, ,→)}
Table 3.1. Transition function of the bit ﬂipping engine (BFE).
The tape head traverses its input sequence left to right, randomly ﬂipping the
binary symbol it is currently reading. As soon as it encounters the blank symbol  ,
the engine moves the head all the way back to where it started and then halts. On
input a binary sequence v, this engine can output, in time polynomial in the length
of v, any binary sequence v
  of length equal to that of v.
The foregoing deﬁnition of a morphing engine is a general one: It only requires
that at least one sequence of input symbols be transformable on any run and any
set of non deterministic choices made by the machine. A stronger deﬁnition of
morphing malware would capture the concept of expectation and preservation of
high transformability, which we call high engine friendliness, of malware variants.
The deﬁnition of engine friendliness follows.
35Deﬁnition 3.2 (Engine Friendliness). Let M denote some morphing engine. The
M-friendliness fr(M,p) of a program p is any measure proportional (not necessarily
linearly) to the size of M(p), which is the set of all the programs that can possibly
be output by M on input p. One such natural measure, denoted fr0(M,p), is the
size of M(p) itself, that is, fr0(M,p)=|M(p)|. Given two programs p and p
 ,w e
will say that p is at least as M-friendly (with respect to M-friendliness measure
fr(.,.)) as p
  if fr(M,p) ≥ fr(M,p
 ).
Code-substituting engines are important examples of morphing engines [9].
Instances of these engines have been reported by anti-virus companies as morphing
engines carrying a ﬁnite set G = L × R of productions, where L and R are arbitrary
non-empty subsets of Σ
∗.T h em e m b e r so fG will henceforth be denoted l → r.F o r
a code substituting engine M,t h eM-friendliness fr1(M,p) of a sequence p may be
given by fr1(M,p)=Σ l∈L|subseq(l,p)|,w h e r e|subseq(l,p)| is the number of
occurences of sequence l in sequence p (overlaps allowed), |x| is the length of
sequence x,a n dL is the set whose members are the left hand sides of the
productions.
Deﬁnition 3.3 (Highly Engine-Friendly Malware). Let M be a morphing engine, s
some arbitrary program, and fr some engine friendliness measure. We say that s is
“highly M-friendly,” with respect to fr,i ffr(M,s) ≥ 2
|s|.
For example, choosing fr(M,s)=|M(s)|, any sequence is a highly BFE-friendly
one, since |BFE(s)| =2
|s|.C h o o s i n gfr(M,s)=1 /|M(s)|, however, does not make
any sequence highly engine-friendly, since the 1/|M(s)| is not proportional to
36|M(s)|. In fact, this choice does not meet our deﬁnition of engine-friendliness.
There is one important direct implication of Deﬁnition 3.3: If a program s
  is
slightly (polynomially) larger than a program s, and if they are both highly
M-friendly with respect to fr,t h e nfr(M,s) is exponentially larger than fr(M,s
 ).
A real world example of this is that of an instruction substituting engine capable of
generating every possible permutation of the constituting instructions of any given
input program. Choosing fr= fr0, all instruction sequences composed of pairwise
distinct instructions are highly engine friendly since the variant set of a sequence of
size n is of size n!, guaranteeing that |M(s)| grows exponentially on the size of s.
The above deﬁnitions capture what we feel are key aspects of the informal
notion of GDPs. One may, of course, argue for alternatives (or approximations) to
these practices. For the purposes of this study, however, we will focus on
“unyielding” morphing malware, which makes no concessions on challenging the
computational resources of the detector.
3.4. Complexity of Exact Recognition of Morphed Malware
We have seen in Chapter 2 that existing formal works on the theory of computer
virus detection (a comprehensie survey of which can be found in [11]) have
discovered that many of the decision problems of membership in a malware’s variant
set are indeed computationally costly. This section deﬁnes the general Morphed
Variant Recognition Problem (MVRPM) as well as several of its subproblems and
examines their computational complexity. Informally, MVRPM is the problem of
37deciding membership in the set of all programs that can possibly be output by a
given morphing engine M to which we have input/output (or black-box) access and
to whose description we may have access. For clarity, (M,x) will be used as needed
in the following proofs to represent a variant of a morphing malware whose engine is
M. The second component typically encodes more than one piece of information,
such as a malicious program and data used by the engine to transform the malicious
program.
3.4.1.MVRPM, GEN
n
M, GEN
∗
M,a n dDENSITYM
Deﬁnition 3.4 ((MVRPM, DM)). Let M denote some morphing engine. The
Morphed Variant Recognition Problem of M is stated as follows: Given a TM
sequence v, does there exist a TM sequence u such that there is a computation of M
which returns v on input u? In other words, given a ﬁxed engine M and two
arbitrary sequences u and v, determine whether v is a morphed variant of u.A
deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine DM is said to be a detector for the
morphed variant set of engine M if it decides MVRPM.
In other words, MVRPM is the problem of deciding menbership in the variant
set of morphing engine M.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the notion of generations of M-descendants of a morphing
malware’s Eve using engine M. Recall that the term Eve is used to refer to the
variant of the malware that one has at hand. The graph in the ﬁgure represents the
relation “y can be output by morphing engine M on input x” between the origin x
of an edge and its destination y.
38 ! 




 




Figure 3.1. Generations of M-descendants of morphing malware Eve.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (M-descendant). Let M denote some morphing engine, a TM
sequence y is a 1
st-generation M-descendant of a sequence x if there exists a
computation of M on input x which returns y. More generally, let n denote some
positive integer. A TM sequence y is an (n +1 )
st-generation M-descendant of x if
and only if y is a 1
st-generation M-descendant of an n
th-generation M-descendant of
x.
In the example of Figure 3.1, a node is an n
th-generation M-descendant of EVE
if there exists, in the graph, a path of length n connecting EVE to the node. A
given node may hence belong to one or more generations of M-descendants of EVE.
Each numerical label lists all of the possible generations of EVE’s M-descendants to
which the labeled node belongs.
The deﬁnition of a detector for a speciﬁc generation of descendants of morphing
malware follows.
Deﬁnition 3.6 (GEN
n
M, D
n
M). For every positive integer n and morphing engine M,
we denote by GEN
n
M the following problem: Given two sequences v and v
  ∈ Σ
∗,i s
v
  an n
th-generation M-descendant of v? A deterministic polynomial-time Turing
39machine D
n
M is said to be a detector for the n
th-generation M-descendants of
M-friendly sequences if it decides GEN
n
M.
This deﬁnition can be extended to the following deﬁnition of a detector for the
set of all possible descendants of a malware variant.
Deﬁnition 3.7 (GENM, DM). For morphing engine M,w ed e n o t eb yGENM the
following problem: Given two sequences v and v
  ∈ Σ
∗, does there exist a positive
integer n such that v
  is an M-descendant of v? A deterministic polynomial-time
Turing machine DM is said to be a detector for M-descendants of M-friendly
sequences if it decides GENM.
Let (M,x) denote a variant of morphing malware satisfying the four GDPs P1,
P2, P3,a n dP4 listed on page 31. The set of all possible descendants of (M,x) will
hence be composed “mostly” of non-overlapping instances of segments inserted by
M into the malware variant being transformed. The ratio of the sum of the sizes of
the sequences inserted by the engine to that of the output variant is high; that is,
bounded below by 1 −   for some small  . This ratio can hence be seen as an
“engine signature,” indicating the potential involvement of the engine in the
transformation of the initial highly engine-friendly sequence. This type of engine
signature is deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 3.8 (Clue-density-based engine signature). Let (1) M denote a morphing
engine, (2) v denote a highly M-friendly sequence, (3) vwitness denote a sequence
returned by M on input v,a n d( 4 )W denote the multiset of sequences inserted by
M into v as a result of this run. The clue-density-based engine signature σM of M
40is given by σM =
Σr∈W|r|
|vwitness|
.
We now introduce DENSITYM, a third detection problem of M-descendants of
highly-engine-friendly malware using a high-friendliness-preserving engine.
Deﬁnition 3.9 ((DENSITYM, DDM)). For high-friendliness-preserving morphing
engine M that may insert one or more of a ﬁnite set of sequences into its input
sequence, we denote by DENSITYM the following problem: Given a sequence v
and the set R = {r1,...,rn} of sequences known to be insertable by M into a
malware variant, does there exist (c1,...,cm) ∈ (Σ
∗)
m such that
1. ∀1 ≤ j ≤ m,∃1 ≤ i ≤ n such that cj = ri,
2. ∃w1,w 2,..,wn,w n+1 ∈ Σ
∗ such that v = w1c1w2c2...wncnwn+1,a n d
3. σM =
 m
i=1 |ci|
|p|
.
A deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine DDM is said to be a
density-based detector for the variant set of engine M if it decides DENSITYM.
In other words, solving DENSITYM is deciding whether a suspect program p
contains non-overlapping occurences of code segments cj each of which is identical
to a sequence insertable by M, and such that the ratio of the sum of their sizes to
that of the size of p is greater than or equal to the signature σM of M.
3.4.2.Complexity Analysis
MVRPM is undecidable, since it is equivalent to learning the exact input/output
behavior of M, which is an undecidable problem by Rice’s theorem. MVRPM’s
considered subproblems GEN
n
M, GEN
∗
M,a n dDENSITYM, however, are not. We
41begin by showing that GEN
n
M is NP-complete.
The NP-completeness proof of GEN
n
M makes use of the NP-completeness of
Boolean Satisﬁability and of Rice’s Theorem. (See Garey and Johnson [17] for a
proof of Rice’s Theroem.)
The typical proof for the NP-completeness of a problem or set L is to show (1)
that the set is in NP and (2) that there exists an NP-complete problem that is
polynomial-time reducible to L. A problem or set L is said to be NP-complete if L is
in NP, and if all sets in NP are polynomial-time reducible to L. L is said to be in
NP if there exists a NDTM M such that x ∈ L i fa n do n l yi ft h e r ee x i s t sa
computation of M that accepts x, for example by entering a predeﬁned “accept”
state and halting. A set A is polynomial-time reducible to a set B if there exists a
polynomial-time computable function f such that x ∈ A if and only if f(x) ∈ B [17].
Boolean satisﬁability (or BSAT) is the problem of deciding, given a formula in
propositional logic, whether or not it is satisﬁable; that is, whether there is a truth
assignment to the variables in the formula that satisﬁes it. For example, using   to
denote “true” and ⊥ to denote “false”, the assignment (x1,x 2,x 3)=(  ,⊥,⊥)i sa
satisfying one for formula (x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3). This formula is hence satisﬁable.
BSAT is a well kown NP-complete problem.
The proof also makes use of so-called “opaque predicates,” which exploit the
general unsolvability of deciding the function computed by a program given just the
program [17]. Opaque predicates have been used to prevent reverse-engineering of
proprietary software. They have also been used by malware writers to obfuscate the
42control ﬂow of their program by, for example, implementing a subprocedure that
always returns a certain constant value. An (opaque) predicate would call this
constant-generating procedure, then use its return value to determine what control
path to take. Of course, this control path is the same each time the predicate is
called because, unbeknownst to the static reverse-engineer or the malware detector,
the procedure returns the same value on all inputs. Such an opacity challenges
static and dynamic program analysis and enables the malware to thwart detection
by introducing arbitrarily complex control paths which will never be executed but
will considerably change the appearance of the malware code.
Theorem 3.1. GEN
n
M is NP-complete.
Proof. Consider the sequence v =( <M> ,f ,i ,s )w h e r e ,
. f is some arbitrary formula in ﬁrst order propositional logic,
. i ∈ N,
. s is a binary ﬂag with values in {⊥, },a n d
. <M>is a TM description (encoding) of a morphing engine M whose behavior is
deﬁned next.
M has as sub-procedures the BFE engine of the previous section and a machine
On that ignores its input and returns some constant integer n>0 in constant time.
M also implements an opaque predicate which calls On and returns   if and only if
n = i. A sequence (<M> ,f ,i ,s ) evolves into a next-generation M-descendant in
the following manner. First, M calls BFE on a sequence of ⊥’s whose length equals
the number of variables in f. Then, it tests f using the sequence c returned by
43BFE as a possible truth assignment for the variables of f, remembering the
outcome of the test. Next, it runs On, remembering the value returned. Finally, if c
is a satisfying assignment and the value returned by On (i.e., n)i se q u a lt oi +1 ,
then M sets s =   and produces (<M> ,f ,n , ). Otherwise, M returns
(<M> ,f ,i+1,⊥). In other words, at each generation, <M>may test any of the
possible satisfying assignments, but reveals that the formula is satisﬁable, if it is,
only for n
th-generation descendants of (<M> ,f ,0,⊥).
Hence, if n =3 ,f =( x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3), i =0 ,s = ⊥,a n dM operates as
described above, then the sequence (<M> ,f ,0,⊥) could mutate as follows (full
TM conﬁguration on either side of the   is omitted for clarity):
(<M> ,f ,0,⊥)   (<M> ,f ,1,⊥), with c = 011
  (<M> ,f ,2,⊥), with c = 101
  (<M> ,f ,3, ), with c = 110
  (<M> ,f ,4,⊥), with c = 101
M is a morphing engine since
1. At least the “generation” component i gets transformed each time an
(<M> ,f ,i ,s ) sequence is processed by M,a n d
2. M runs in time polynomial in the length of its input (<M> ,f ,i ,s ): BFE and
the formula evaluation phases run in time polynomial in the length of the formula.
On by construction runs in constant time.
44Let M
n denote the procedure which is constructed by composing M with itself n
times. M
n is a non-deterministic procedure that runs in polynomial time (a constant
multiple of M’s running time). GEN
n
M can hence be decided in nondeterministic
polynomial time by querying M
n on input (M,f,0,⊥) and returning   if a
sequence identical to the suspected n
th-generation descendant is returned by M
n.
GEN
n
M is thus in NP. Now, if an eﬃcient D
n
M existed for (<M> ,f ,0,⊥), then we
could use it to answer the question “Does (<M> ,f ,0,⊥)  
n (<M> ,f ,n , )
hold?” and hence solve BSAT in polynomial time.
Therefore, GEN
n
M is NP-complete.
Corollary 3.1.
 
m≥n
GEN
m
M is NP-complete for all positive integer n.
Proof. Immediate using a slight modiﬁcation to the proof of the previous theorem:
T h ee n g i n ed o e sn o tr e s e tt h ev a l u eo ft h es ﬂag to ⊥ on evolutions beyond
n
th-generation M-descendants. That is, once f is found to be satisﬁable on an n
th
run of the engine, the information is propagated in subsequent runs. A
polynomial-time decider of members of m
th-generation M-descendants of
(<M> ,f ,0,⊥), where m ≥ n, would still be a polynomial-time decider for
BSAT.
Corollary 3.2. GEN
∗
M is NP-complete.
Proof. GEN
∗
M is equal to
 
m>=1
GEN
m
M, which is NP-complete by the previous
corollary.
45Theorem 3.2. DENSITYM is NP-complete.
Proof. DENSITYM is in NP: A certiﬁcate of the form (c1,...,cm), where each ci is
identical to some sequence rj insertable by M, can be eﬃciently determined to
satisfy (1), (2), and (3) of the deﬁnition of DENSITYM.
We show that all problems in NP are polynomial-time reducible to DENSITYM
by reducing the decision version of the Unbounded Knpasack Problem (UKP),
which is a well-known NP-complete problem [17], to it. UKP is deﬁned as follows.
Instance: Suppose we have a knapsack that can hold a maximum weight of W,a
positive integer v,a n das e tI = {xi :1≤ i ≤ n} of items. Suppose further that
each item xi is accompanied with a (weight, value) pair (wi,v i) and that we have an
unlimited supply of each item.
Question: Does there exist a multiset (i.e., a set with redundancies allowed)
J = {x
 
j :1≤ j ≤ m},w h e r ee a c hx
 
j i se q u a lt os o m exi satisfying Σ
m
j=1wj ≤ W,
and Σ
m
j=1vj ≥ v. Using the standard approach for reducing a given problem to
another [45], every instance of UKP can be reduced to an instance of DENSITYM
by setting
. (xi,w i,v i) → (ri,|ri|,|ri|),
. W →| p|,a n d
. v → g = σM ×| p|.
This construction of a DENSITYM instance from a UKP instance is polynomial.
Now, suppose that there exists a deterministic polynomial-time Turing machine
DDM which takes as input the set {ri :1≤ i ≤ n} of sequences insertable by M,a
46sequence p, and a signature σM and answers the question “Does there exist a tuple
(c1,...,cm) ∈ (Σ
∗)
m satisfying (1),(2), and (3) of Deﬁnition 3.9?” If this machine
exists then a polynomial-time decider for UKP exists. Therefore DENSITYM is
NP-complete.
The undecidability of MVRPM and the NP-completeness of its considered
subproblems clearly suggest that work should proceed in the direction of devising
eﬃcient approximate solutions to the subproblems. A number of these tools are
presented and evaluated in the remainder this dissertation.
47CHAPTER 4
APPROXIMATE DENSITYM
DENSITYM was shown to be NP-complete in Chapter 3. In this chapter we
propose and successfully evaluate an eﬃcient, approximate solution to DENSITYM
in the context of deciding membership in the variant set of a known closed-world
morphing engine that performs the instruction substitution transformations
described in Chapter 2.
4.1. Targeted Class of Morphing Malware
Let M denote our target instruction-substituting morphing engine. We will use the
term clue to refer to any sequence of instructions extracted from a suspect program
and suggesting that the program may have been generated by M.W ed e n o t eb yT
the rule set carried by M. Since we are targeting closed-world morphing engines,
the set T must be explicitly carried by the engine and is assumed to be extractable
manually, or interactively from the engine in a laboratory environment. Each rule in
T maps an instruction (the left hand side) to a sequence of one or more instructions.
This sequence is referred to as the right hand side of the rule. Right hand sides are
thus examples of clues. Clues are chosen and assigned weights equal to their
instruction count. This choice of weight assignment is arbitrary and may not be the
best in all cases, but it suits our purposes.
Permission to include the contributions presented in this chapter was obtained from the Asso-
ciation for Computing Machinery and is included in the Appendix.Using the fr0(M,p) measure of engine-friendliness given in Chapter 3, we say
that a code segment is highly M-friendly if the ratio of the frequency of the left
hand sides of T which occur in the segment to the number of instructions in the
segment is greater than 1 −   for a small  >0. M is also assumed to implement the
high-engine-friendliness-preservation requirement of GDPs. Writers of morphing
malware sometimes attempt to achieve this by requiring that at least one
occurrence of a left hand side occurs in all right hand sides [6].
Given a code segment s, suspected of being (part of) a program output by M,
we abstract each instruction in s to its opcode mnemonic. This abstraction of the
actual instruction is actually needed to represent the (typically intractably large) set
of possible right hand sides that a transformation involving variables taking on
scalar values might generate.
The high engine-friendliness of a morphing malware variant coupled with the
need to leave as small a region as possible unchanged in the variant imply that a
closed-world instruction-substituting engine will insert one or more of a-priori
known code segments in place of the transformable region. These a-priori known
segments form what we call a clue-density of a morphed variant with code segments
inserted by the engine. In Figure 4.1, the ratio of the sum of the lengths of the
shaded segments to the length of the complete output segment captures the density
of the segment with clues inserted by a ﬁctitious instruction-substituting engine.
We argue that the high engine friendliness and
high-engine-friendliness-preservation requirement of GDPs causes engines to “do
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Figure 4.1. High engine friendliness. Most of the instructions in the output segment
belong to right hand sides inserted by the engine.
more work” on the variant being transformed. For instruction-substituting engines,
the amount of work performed by the engine is reﬂected by the ubiquity of right
hand sides it inserts in the output variant.
4.2. Variant Scoring
We deﬁne a scoring function that takes as input a code segment (a sequence of x86
opcode mnemonics) and returns a score for that sequence. For a given code segment
V, the score of V with respect to M, which we denote by SM(V ), is a measure of
how likely V is to be (part of) a program generated by M. SM(V ) is proportional to
the evidence linking V to M and inversely proportional to the instruction count of
V . The expression of SM takes into account the fact that some of the clues are more
informative than others. The scoring function is given by the expression
SM(V )=
 
s
 
c
wcesc/| V |,w h e r e| V | is the instruction count of V , wc is the
weight of clue c (in this case, its instruction count), and esc =1i fc l u ec is at site s
and 0 otherwise. A na¨ ıve algorithm computing this function would simply do a
linear scan of V . For each instruction i visited, it would determine whether i is the
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Figure 4.2. An example of clue-density computation. The highlighted segments are
right hand sides inserted by a ﬁctitious instruction-substituting engine.
beginning of an occurrence of one or more clues. If it is, it would accumulate the
sum of the weights of these clues in some variable. It would ﬁnally divide the
accumulated sum by the instruction count of V then return the result. Figure 4.2
gives an example using the scoring function.
4.2.1.Evaluation: W32.Evol
We implemented a prototype simulator of a target morphing engine, that of the
W32.Evol virus [4], and used it to run two experiments to evaluate the scoring
function. A code segment is abstracted to a list of opcode mnemonics in the same
order in which they appear in the segment. The rule set of W32.Evol was simulated
using a list of pairs of such tuples. The simulator was restricted to mapping
single-element tuples to larger ones, thus capturing the morphing transformation
51which substitutes an instruction with possibly larger code segments. For simplicity
we will denote by M the abstraction of W32.Evol’s morphing engine.
4.2.2.Experiments
Evaluation 1 (Attributing simulated M-descendants of arbitrary Evest oM): The
goal of this ﬁrst experiment was to determine how well the scoring function can
assist in discriminating morphed variants from arbitrary code segments. We expect
that the scoring will work better when clues are more prevalent, that is, when the
M-friendliness of the transformed segment is high. The experiment consisted of a
number of simulations. Each simulation generated a “ﬁrst generation” Eve segment
with a ﬁxed M-friendliness and used the engine to produce a thousand
M-descendants of the segment from each of second to seventh generation. The
choice to go that deep in generating M-descendants of the Eve was arbitrary but
nevertheless suﬃcient to make preliminary claims about the scoring function. We
computed the scores of the M-descendants thus simulated and analyzed their
frequency distributions. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 give the frequency distributions of the
second through seventh generations of variants produced on input programs of
M-friendliness 5% and 50%, respectively.
Evaluation 2 (Attributing simulated M-descendants of W32.Evol’s Eve to M):
The goal of this second experiment was to determine how well the scoring function
can assist in discriminating morphed variants of known malware from arbitrary code
segments. For this experiment we took a variant of the W32.Evol malware,
52Figure 4.3. Experiment 1: SM distribution for M-descendants of a 5%-friendly Eve.
extracted its opcode list and, using M, generated a thousand each of second, third,
and fourth generation simulated M-descendants of Eve.W ec o m p u t e dt h es c o r eo f
each of these sets of M-descendants and analyzed the frequency distribution of
these scores. The simulation results are shown in Figure 4.5. We also computed the
scores of real W32.Evol second, third, and fourth-generation descendants of
W32.Evol’s Eve. They scored 1.62, 1.95, and 2.13, respectively.
4.2.3.Discussion
A binary classiﬁer taking as input a segment’s score and using a threshold of 0.1 on
segment scores cleanly separated M-descendants of W32.Evol’s Eve,a sw e l la s
M-descendants of arbitrary Eve’s whose M-friendliness was over 50%, from
M-independent code segments, whose highest score was 0.013.
While the evaluation of the scoring function induced a perfect classiﬁer for the
ﬁrst three generations of M-descendants of W32.Evol’s Eve, its generalizability is
53Figure 4.4. Experiment 1: SM distribution for M-desendants of a 50%-friendly Eve.
Figure 4.5. Experiment 2: SM distribution for simulated W32.Evol variants.
54not immediate. It may however be evaluated on a case-by-case basis on newly
discovered morphing malware and, if successful, used in practice to detect
descendants of that malware.
It can be implied from experiment 1 that writing malware with a 5%
M-friendliness would be one way to evade our ability to cleanly separate
engine-independent segments from M-descendants of arbitrary, 5% M-friendly, Eves
(at least for the ﬁrst generation): the lowest score of the ﬁrst generation
M-descendants of arbitrary 5% M-friendly Eve was recored at 0.009 while the
highest score for an engine-independent segment was 0.013. But, again, low
engine-friendliness implies that a good section of any variant of the malware will not
be transformable, which defeats the very purpose of GDPs and leaves the malware
vulnerable to detection by traditional signature scanning.
Other kinds of clue-scoring weight assignment can also be postulated. For
example, a stand-alone garbage segment (which can be determined by evaluating
the rules of the transformation system) could be given more weight than a right
hand side segment; intuitively, odds are low that a benign program contains a
particular do-nothing segment, especially a large one, known to be routinely
inserted by M at more than one location.
Some engines, such as W32.Simile (a.k.a. MetaPHOR), shrink code by applying
transformations mapping relatively large code segments to smaller ones. The
shrinking part (or application of expanding rules both ways), should adversely aﬀect
the current scoring function if the engine takes the shrinking direction of the rules
55(considerably) more often than it does the expanding direction, inducing smaller
clues in the output program. In order to thoroughly defeat the function, most of the
smaller segments must be of minimal size; that is, in the order of one instruction
each, leaving malware authors with fewer transformation options to replace any
given instruction.
56CHAPTER 5
APPROXIMATE GEN
N
M AND GEN
∗
M
The problems GEN
n
M and GEN
∗
M were shown to be NP-complete in Chapter 3. In
this chapter we propose approximate solutions to GEN
n
M and GEN
∗
M.W ed os oi n
the context of deciding membership in each generation of descendants of a morphing
malware’s Eve that uses a known closed-world morphing engine that performs
probabilistic instruction substitution transformations described in Chapter 2,
perhaps along with other morphing transformations. We start by giving an overview
of the theory of Markov chains that will be used in the remainder of the chapter. A
model of the target malware is then presented and the evolution of the malware’s
instruction frequency vector is modeled as a ﬁrst order Markov chain. Existing
knowledge about Markov chains is then used to construct an approximate detector
for descendants of this malware.
5.1. Markov Chains
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Markov Chains). For positive integer n,l e tS = {si :1≤ i ≤ n} be
some ﬁnite set of n objects, and T =( pij)1≤i≤j≤n some n × n matrix. The pair
(S,T) is called a Markov chain if for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
 
1≤j≤n
pij =1 .T h em e m b e r so f
S are called the states of the chain, T is called the transition matrix of the chain,
and each element pij of T is called the transition probability from state si to state sj.
Permission to include the contributions presented in this chapter was obtained from the Asso-
ciation for Computing Machinery and is included in the Appendix.A state si of a Markov chain is called absorbing if it is impossible to leave it (i.e.,
pii = 1). A Markov chain is called absorbing if it has at least one absorbing state,
and if from every state it is possible to go to an absorbing state (not necessarily in
one step). In an absorbing Markov chain, the probability that the process will be
absorbed is 1. A Markov chain is called ergodic,o rirreducible, if it is possible to go
from every state to every state (not necessarily in one move). A Markov chain is
called regular if and only if some power of its transition matrix has only positive
elements. In other words, for some positive integer n,i ti sp o s s i b l et og of r o ma n y
state to any state in exactly n steps. It follows that every regular chain is ergodic.
Examples of these special Markov chains follow.
Example 5.1. The chain deﬁned by
T0 =




s1 s2
s1 0.50 .5
s2 0.01 .0




is absorbing since p21, which is the probability of leaving state s2, equals zero. s2 is
hence an absorbing state for this chain.
Example 5.2. The chain deﬁned by
T1 =








s1 s2 s3
s1 0.25 0.25 0.50
s2 0.00 0.50 0.50
s3 0.50 0.00 0.50








is ergodic since every state is eventually reachable from every other state. T1 also
happens to be regular since
58T
2
1 =



0.25 0.25 0.50
0.00 0.50 0.50
0.50 0.00 0.50






0.25 0.25 0.50
0.00 0.50 0.50
0.50 0.00 0.50


 =



0.31 0.19 0.50
0.25 0.25 0.50
0.38 0.12 0.50



has only positive elements. (Decimal numbers were rounded to the nearest
hundredth.)
5.2. Engine-Induced IFV Transition Matrix
In this section, the formal model of a target morphing engine M is presented and
then used to construct the IFV transition matrix of the engine.
We target the class of closed-world morphing malware that uses a morphing engine
that applies a ﬁxed, ﬁnite set of transformation rules, each rule mapping an
instruction (the left hand side) to a sequence of multiple instructions (the right hand
side). These rules, typically carried in the engine’s code, are used by the engine to
probabilistically substitute, in the variant being transformed, occurrences of the left
hand sides of the rules with one of their corresponding right hand sides. These
probabilities are assumed to be ﬁxed, or exactly learnable from the description of
the engine, for each rule of the transformation system. The model of morphing
malware used in this section abstracts an assembly language instruction by ignoring
register names and variable values; one symbol is used to represent registers and
another to represent variable values. For example, the segment push eax; mov
eax,ebx; mov ebx,5 is abstracted to push reg; mov reg,reg; mov reg,imm.
In the sequel we will loosely use the phrase “code segment” to refer to the
abstraction of the actual code segment.
59li →{ r
i1
i r
i2
i r
i3
i }
1 mov [reg1+imm], reg2 → push reg push reg
mov reg, imm mov reg, reg1
mov [reg1+reg], reg2 add reg,imm1
pop reg mov [reg+imm2], reg2
pop reg
2 mov reg, imm → mov reg, imm1 mov reg, imm1 mov reg, imm1
add reg, imm2 sub reg, imm2 xor reg, imm2
3 push reg → push reg
mov reg, imm
4 sub reg reg → xor reg, reg
Figure 5.1. Example rule set.
5.2.1.Notations
Standard notations from set and formal language theories are used throughout. In
particular, for sets A and B, A
∗ denotes the set of all ﬁnite sequences of elements of
A , A
+ denotes the set of all non-empty ﬁnite sequences of elements of A.F o r
positive integer n, A
n denotes the cross product of A with itself n times. An
element of A
n is hence a sequence of n elements of A.T h es y m b o lN denotes the set
of non-negative integers. Finally, given a positive integer n and a sequence
x =( x1,x 2,...,xn) ∈ N
n, we deﬁne the norms ||x||1 =
n  
i=1
|xi| and
||x||∞ = max(|x1|,|x2|,...,|xn|). Notations are introduced as needed and listed in
Table 5.1 for quick reference.
Instruction Frequency Vectors (IFVs): Let P denote some program and n the
number of distinct instructions occuring in P. The instruction frequency vector of
P, denoted IFV(P), is the n-tuple each of whose components represents exactly
one opcode mnemonic and holds the frequency (or count) of that mnemonic in P.
No two components may represent the same mnemonic.
605.2.2.Engine Modeling
Let I = {I1,I 2,...,Im} denote the set of valid instructions for the considered
computing platform (e.g., the IA-32 instruction set) and let T denote a ﬁnite set of
n productions li →{ (Pr
j
i,r
j
i):1≤ j ≤ imax)},w h e r eli ∈I , r
j
i ∈I
+,a n dP r
j
i is the
probability of use of the sequence of instructions r
j
i to substitute an occurrence of li
in the program being transformed. In order to allow the engine to choose whether
or not to transform an occurrence of li, we require that exactly one of the r
j
i’s be
identical to li. We also require that the identity
imax  
j=1
Pr
j
i = 1 hold for each
production and that two diﬀerent productions not have identical left hand sides.
The probabilities of use are assumed to be ﬁxed for each production and
extractable interactively from the morphing engine. Furthermore, if the engine is
not available, these probabilities may also be estimated from large corpora of
programs, where each corpus contains members of some speciﬁc generation of
descendants of some Eve. Probabilities of use may for example be implemented (as
in the W32.Evol and W32.Simile metamorphic viruses) using a random number
generating procedure that is part of the engine and that makes its choices at run
time by reading arbitrary memory locations. If the latter is the case then we assume
that the choices are uniform; Pr
j
i =
1
imax
for each r
j
i. Whenever the morphing engine
visits an instruction that is also the left hand side li of some production, with
probability Pr
j
i the engine substitutes li for r
j
i.
We now deﬁne what, for the purposes of this treatment, constitutes a program
state, and how the transition probabilities from one such state to another may be
61I = {I1,I 2,...,Im}
The Instruction set of a target computing platform.
OCC
The function from (I+,I)t oN mapping each (P,Ii) pair to the frequency of instruction
Ii in code segment P.
Z
Z The function from R to {0,1} which returns 1 if and only if its argument is 0.
T = {li →{ (Pr
j
i,r
j
i):1≤ j ≤ imax)}}
The set of n productions used by the morphing engine to transform its input. li ∈I ,
r
j
i ∈I +, exactly one r
j
i is identical to li,a n d
imax  
j=1
Pr
j
i = 1, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Pr
j
i
The probability of use of right hand side element r
j
i (i.e., the probability that r
j
i is chosen
to replace an instance of li).
Fi,k(β)
For instructions Ii and Ik, Fi,k(β) returns the probability that, on input one instance of
Ii, the engine generates β instances of Ik.
Gi,k(α,β)
For instructions Ii and Ik, α ∈ N,a n dβ ∈ N, G(α,β) returns the probability that, on
input α instances of Ii, the engine generates β instances of Ik. It returns 0 if α =0 .
  αi,k
For 1 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ m, this expression denotes the segment (subvector) of a program’s IFV
which starts at instruction Ii and ends at instruction Ik.
Hk(  αi,j,β)
For β ∈ N,1≤ i ≤ j ≤ m,a n d1≤ k ≤ m, this function returns the probability that β
instances of instruction Ik are generated by the engine on input a program with IFV   α1,m,
where all of   α1,m’s components are 0 except, perhaps, for subvector   αi,j.
T(  α1,m,   β1,m)
The probability that, on input a program with IFV   α1,m, the probabilistic instruction
substituting engine generates a program with IFV   β1,m.
Table 5.1. Notations used in matrix computation.
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Figure 5.2. Simple state transition.
computed, or at least approximated.
State. To be consistent with the terminology used in Markov chain theory, we
will use the term “state” (normally called abstraction) to refer to a program’s IFV.
Figure 5.2 illustrates a simple example of a state transition induced on a code
fragment by some probabilistic instruction substituting engine.
State Transition Probability. Given two program states   α1,m and   β1,m,t h e
transition probability from   α1,m to   β1,m is the probability that, on input a program
whose state is   α1,m, the morphing engine produces a program whose state is   β1,m.
5.2.3.Detection using Instruction Frequency Vectors
Existing work on Markov chains [46] has identiﬁed certain interesting classes of
chains and ways of using a chain’s transition matrix to infer useful information
about the process it represents.
63Two of these results clearly suggest how and when the transition matrix computed
in Section 5.2 can be used to assist in the detection of descendants of a given
malware variant.
1. Distribution Prediction Using the Successive Powers of the Transition Matrix. A
Markov chain T is typically started in a state chosen by a probability distribution
on the set of states, called a probability vector.L e t  u denote a probability vector
which holds the initial probabilities of a malware’s state. The powers of T are
known to give interesting information about the evolution of these distributions
from one malware generation to the next: For any positive integer n,t h eij
th entry
(T
n)ij of T
n gives the probability that the chain, starting in state si, will be in state
sj after n steps. More generally, if we let u
n = uT
n, then the probability that an
n
th-generation malware descendant is in some state si after n transitions is the i
th
component of u
n.
2. Convergence towards a stationary state distribution. For every transition matrix
T of a Markov chain with a ﬁnite space, there exists at least one stationary
distribution   π , i.e., a row vector   π satisfying   π =   πT. Furthermore, if T is
irreducible and aperiodic, then it has a unique, a-priori computable, stationary
distribution   π given by lim
n→∞T
n =   1.  π,w h e r e  1 is a column vector all of whose
entries equal 1. Hence, for malware whose starting probability distribution on the
set of IFVs happens to be a stationary distribution for its engine’s IFV transition
matrix, the corresponding states of the elements of every generation of descendants
of the malware will be distributed as indicated by   π.
64Computation of IFV Transition Probabilities
The state transition probability, T(  α1,m,   β1,m), is computed using the probabilities
Fi,k, Gi,k,a n dHk deﬁned above.
Computation of Fi,k(β): This probability is expressed as
Fi,k(β)=
imax  
j=0
Z(β − OCC(r
j
i,I k)) × Pr
j
i.
Computation of Gi,k(α,β): We view the probabilistic instruction substitution
process of α instances of instruction Ii as α independent events (individual
substitutions of each of the α instances of instruction Ii). The outcome of each of
these events may yield zero or more occurrences of instruction Ik.L e t
S = {δ : Fi,k(δ)  =0 } denote the set of all possible counts of instruction Ik that can
be generated by the engine on input an instance of instruction Ii.L e tS
α
β denote the
set of α-tuples   δ =( δ1,δ 2,...,δα)o fe l e m e n t so fS such that ||  δ||1 = β. Gi,k(α,β)i s
given by Gi,k(α,β)=
 
  δ∈Sα
β
α  
j=1
Fi,k(δj). Unfortunately, the problem of ﬁnding a
  δ ∈ S
α such that ||  δ||1 − β is equal to β is an NP-complete one. In fact, computing
any α-tuple x whose ||.||1 equals a ﬁxed β is an instance of the SUBSET SUM
problem and is hence NP-complete. In practice, one may then want to choose to use
a polynomial-time approximation scheme [17] for computing each of the Gi,k(α,β).
Computation of Hk(  α1,m,β): This probability can be recursively computed by
observing that for 1 <i<m , Hk(  αi,m,β)=
β  
δ=0
Fi,k(δ) × Hk(  αi+1,m,β− δ). The
recursion stops when i +1=m, that, is when we ask for the value of
Hk(  αm,m,β− δ). This value is computed by observing that
65Hk(  αm,m,β− δ)=Gm,k(||  αm,m||1,β− δ).
Computation of T(  α1,m,   β1,m): This probability is given by
T(  α1,m,   β1,m)) =
m  
i=1
H(  α1,m,||  βi,i||1).
5.2.4.Matrix Optimization
In theory, the set of all possible IFVs is inﬁnite, since inﬁnite growth in size is a
theoretical option for morphing malware. It is hence necessary in practice to at least
impose an upper bound on the size of this set while limiting, as much as possible,
the deterioration of the predictive and classiﬁcation power of the transition matrix.
Possible heuristics for doing so include, but may not be limited to, (1) reducing the
size of the instruction set by abstracting an assembly language instruction to its
opcode mnemonic or by ignoring register names and variable values, (2) imposing
an upper bound on the possible frequency of each individual instruction, (3)
imposing an upper bound on an IFV’s norm ||.||∞, and (4) abstracting each
component of an IFV to one of two values (“low” or “high”), depending on whether
that component is less than or greater than some threshold.
5.3. Using Average IFVs to solve GEN
n
M
In this section we present a procedure that predicts, for a given positive integer n
and an Eve of a probabilistic instruction-substituting malware, the average IFV of
n
th-generation descendants of Eve. We then describe how the predicted IFV is used
to classify a suspect program as an n
th-generation descendant of Eve.
665.3.1.Prediction
The average of the IFVs of any given ﬁrst-generation descendant of Eve can be
exactly predicted given the IFV of Eve and a full description of the probabilistic
transformation system of the engine. A predicted instruction frequency vector is
extracted from a given Eve, and given some positive integer n, to use as an
approximation of the average of the instruction frequency vectors of the
n
th-generation descendants of Eve.
The predicted instruction frequency vector is returned by the procedure
described in Algorithm 1. The procedure takes as input a malware Eve and returns
a predicted instruction frequency vector PIFV 1(Eve) of ﬁrst-generation
descendants of Eve.
The outer foreach loop of Algorithm 1 can be nested into a new loop that
would run it n times, for some positive integer n. After each i
th run, the new loop
would make the inner loop use PIFV i(A)a si t sn e wAIFV (EVE). This
augmentation allows the basic prediction procedure of Algorithm 1 to produce the
predicted instruction frequency vector PIFV n(A)o fn
th-generation descendants of
its input Eve.
The algorithm can certainly be optimized to handle only the subset of the
instruction set composed exclusively of those instructions which appear in its input
probabilistic transformation system and malware variant. This way a smaller vector
containing only the frequencies of these instructions would have to be constructed
and manipulated.
67Algorithm 1: Distribution Prediction
input : The transformation system T of an instruction-substituting morphing
malware, and
The actual instruction frequency vector AIFV (Eve)o fs o m ee v eEve of
the malware
output: The predicted instruction frequency vector PIFV1(Eve)o f
ﬁrst-generation descendants of Eve
/*The expression v[I] is the component of IFV v that represents instruction I.
For each production in T,P r 0
i is the probability that the left hand side li is not
transformed by the engine.*/;
foreach instruction I do
if I is identical to the left hand side li of some rule of T then
PIFV1(Eve)[I]+ =  Pr0
i × AIFV (Eve)[I] ;
foreach r
j
i do
foreach instruction I  in r
j
i do
PIFV1(Eve)[I ]+ =  OCC(r
j
i,I ) × AIFV (Eve)[I] × Pr
j
i 
end
end
end
else
PIFV1(Eve)[I]+ = AIFV (Eve)[I]
end
end
Return PIFV1(Eve);
5.3.2.Extraction and Precision
We choose the Euclidian norm to measure vector magnitude. The Euclidian norm
||x||2 of a vector x =( x1,x 2,...,xm) is the square root of
m  
i=1
x
2
i. The distance
||x − y||2 between x and some vector y =( y1,y 2,...,ym) is the square root of
m  
i=1
(xi − yi)
2.
68The normalized distance dn(A,P) between the IFV of a suspect program P and the
predicted frequency vector PIFV n(Eve)o fn
th-generation descendants of a given
malware Eve is captured by the expression
dn(Eve,P)=||AIFV (P) − PIFV n(Eve)||2/||PIFV n(Eve)||2.
On input a program P, a classiﬁer works by looking for a value of n that minimizes
dn(Eve,P), say below some threshold  n. The classiﬁer would declare P an
n
th-generation descendant of Eve if some n is found such that dn(Eve,P) <  n.
5.3.3.Evaluation: W32.Evol
A small case study was performed in order to explore how well the classiﬁer works,
i.e., how well the predicted IFVs can separate the descendants and non-descendants.
The general design involves extracting the predicted instruction form distributions
for several generations, examining how well these matched various simulated
descendants, and then exploring how well the classiﬁer works. The study was
performed using the metamorphic virus W32.Evol. This study is limited since it
uses only one engine; it serves only as a proof-of-concept that the approach may be
used to discriminate arbitrary code from possible descendants of morphing malware
using a non-trivial morphing engine.
Subjects and Preparation
W32.Evol was chosen because it meets our deﬁnition of malware using a
probabilistic instruction-substituting morphing engine. Analysis of W32.Evol
revealed that its engine chooses to transform instructions that happen to be left
69hand sides of its transformation system by reading a string of three bits at some
memory location randomly computed at run time and transforming if the bit string
is 000. We hence assigned the value .875, seven times out of eight, to the probability
that left hand side li is not transformed. Once the decision is made to transform,
the members of any given right hand side are equally likely to be chosen. We hence
assigned the value
0.125
imax − 1
to the probabilities of use Pr
j
i for each production.
The probabilistic transformation model was used to construct a probabilistic
generator of simulated descendants. 5,000 simulated descendants were created using
this simulator; these consisted of 1,000 simulated samples from 5 diﬀerent
generations. Another 5,000 simulated “non-variant” code segments were also
generated. These segments were made up exclusively of those instructions that are
processable by the engine. They were generated in order to challenge the IFV-based
predictor; completely random simulated programs are unlikely to contain many of
the instructions from the predicted IFVs, and even ordinary Windows executables
may not contain many instructions from the predicted IFVs since the compilers may
not generate them.
8,421 benign executables and DLL ﬁles were selected from a typical and clean
Windows XP Pro installation. They were selected by collecting all such ﬁles
together and keeping only those that disassemble using the objdump program from
GNU binutils.
70Apparatus
A small program was written to extract out the actual IFVs from executables; it
disassembles the executables using objdump before abstracting the instructions and
collecting the IFVs of the resulting abstractions.
A distance calculator was created that takes as input a predicted IFV and an
actual IFV, and then outputs the distance between them, as outlined in the
previous section. Next, a classiﬁer was constructed such that, when given a
threshold, predicted IFV for a given generation, and actual IFV for a program P,
classiﬁes P as a descendant or non-descendant.
Protocol
Distances between IFVs of simulated samples and the predicted IFV were recorded
for each of the 5 generations. For example, for generation 1, the distance between
PIFV 1(Eve)a n dAIFV (P) was recorded for the 1,000 simulated samples P for
that generation.
A distance threshold of .6 was selected for the classiﬁer based on an examination
of the distances observed in the above. The actual IFVs for the 8,421 authentic
benign ﬁles were extracted using the program described above. Then these actual
distributions plus those of the 5,000 simulated descendants and 5,000 simulated
benign ﬁles were submitted to the classiﬁer. The classiﬁer used the predicted IFVs
from generations 1 through 5 to classify these inputs, and the classiﬁcation decisions
were recorded. In addition, a simple receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
71Table 5.2. Evaluation of the distribution measure: The distances of 1,000 samples
from each generation were measured to the predicted IFV for that generation. The
measured distances are organized in bins of size .05.
gen [0.,.05) [.05,.10) [.10,.15) [.15,.20) [.20,.25) [.25,.30) [.30,.35) ≥.35
1 267 729 4 - - - - -
2 - 398 598 4 - - - -
3 - - 406 593 1 - - -
4 - - - 204 775 21 - -
5 - - - - 14 703 281 2
graph [47] was constructed by varying the threshold from .05 to 1.0 in .05
increments.
Results
The ﬁrst part of the study provides an indication of what distances can be expected
in matching the averaged, generation-speciﬁc predicted IFV to actual IFVs of
descendants. The results are reported in Table 5.2. Each row i of the table reports
how many simulated descendants fell within given distance ranges. For example, for
the third generation, 496 simulated third-generation descendants had their actual
IFVs within [.10,.15) of the predicted IFV.
The ROC graph showed that two classes were cleanly separable using the
distance measure. That is, when the threshold was lower than the lowest
non-variant distance, then precision and recall were perfect, except in those cases
where the threshold was also less than the maximum distance for the variants, in
which case recall was less than perfect.
72This is expected, as the lowest non-variant distance recorded was .946, which is
greater than the maximum distance recorded in Table 5.2.
Discussion
The study is limited in a number of important ways. It does not measure the eﬀects
of host programs in the speciﬁc case of parasitic ﬁle-infecting viruses. Nonetheless,
even though the study is of a single case, we expect that the W32.Evol case is fairly
typical of a practically important class of morphing engines. The perfect
classiﬁcation scores and low distances measured still provide evidence of the basic
feasibility of the detection method proposed in this section.
The source of the classiﬁcation power in distinguishing descendants from
non-descendants may simply be that the repertoire of instruction abstractions for
W32.Evol are highly restricted and, thus, not substantially similar to the IFVs one
would ﬁnd in benign ﬁles—or perhaps even other malware. This information may
be more discriminating than using simply bytes or operations (without operands),
which has been common in other statistical treatments in the ﬁeld [43,48]. For
example, as Bilar [43] showed, the distributions of the operations alone are unlikely
to be distinguishing enough. Instruction forms, however, carry more speciﬁc
information, and a typical closed-world morphing engine may be expected to
generate only a restricted subset of these. The study does not shed light on whether
the IFVs provide a strong enough signal to reliably detect in executables with
ﬁle-parasitic viruses infecting an executable. If it does not, it may not be necessary
73to actually separate the parasitic code from its host before detection. If this cannot
be done, the technique may need to be restricted to only the non-parasitic morphing
malware, such as stand-alone Trojans, downloaders, etc.
Table 5.2 indicates that the heuristic of averaging the IFVs may be reasonable
since the distance between actual and average tends to be small even for several
generations. In addition, the table indicates that, for this particular metamorphic
engine, we may expect the classiﬁcation accuracy to drop as the number of
generations increase. This may be an artifact of W32.Evol’s particular engine, as it
is “divergent” in the sense that it contains several instruction substitutions that
replace single instructions with multiple instructions. It may also be in part due to
the statistical nature of the test. For a generation i>1, the range of possible IFVs
in the succeeding generation may be more “spread out” in the sense that the
distances between actual IFVs and the predicted IFV may be greater. To wit, the
distance of the actual IFVs of ﬁrst generation descendants to their predicted average
may be the smallest because the average IFV is predicted on input a relatively
smaller number of modiﬁcations of the Eve. This noted, for the study the loss is
nevertheless not too severe that the classiﬁcations could not be practically useful, as
W32.Evol grows too quickly between generations to permit variants with long
descendant histories to be seen in the wild.
745.4. Relaxations
In addition to allowing garbage inserting transformations which are modelable as
ﬁxed transformation rules (i.e., which map an instruction to a code segment of
ﬁnite, ﬁxed size), we allow the following relaxations to the target probabilistic
instruction-substituting engine.
1. The engine may not perform any condition checking. T h ee n g i n ei sf r e et o
rewrite any or all of the left hand side instances without the need to perform
condition checking. The garbage-inserting rule described above is a good example of
the engine simply making the assumption that the condition “immediately after
each push eax instruction, the contents of register eax may be safely altered” is
TRUE. This relaxation is based on the observation that condition checking may not
be an optimal design choice of morphing malware since it typically increases the
engine’s transformation time; it may require the engine to statically solve
potentially costly (and sometimes unsolvable) problems. Allowing this relaxation
adds non-condition-checking malware to our targeted class of malware. See
Walenstein et al. [9] for more on the design choices of morphing malware.
2. The engine may perform additional transformations as long as they are not
IFV-altering. The engine may perform extra transformations to the variant being
transformed as long as they do not change the IFV of that variant. Such
transformations include register renaming and instruction reordering. These
transformations (except perhaps for the instruction reordering transformation) are
75typically preferred by malware writers since they are relatively easy to implement
and contribute to changing the code of the variant being transformed. Allowing this
relaxation adds non-IFV-altering malware to our targeted class of malware.
The ﬁrst relaxation is reasonable because the malware signature prediction and
detection procedures presented in this chapter are independent of the semantics of
the malware. The second relaxation is reasonable because these procedures are
speciﬁcally designed to detect the eﬀects of the instruction substitution
transformation and assume that only instruction substitution aﬀects the IFV of the
malware code, i.e., any other subsequent transformations performed by the engine
do not aﬀect the IFV of the malware code.
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Figure 5.3. Morphing transformations.
76Since we are dealing with an engines which substitutes an instruction by code
segments of size greater than or equal to one, the size of a descendant of a given
variant may be greater than that of the variant. It is clearly a plausible requirement
of good design practices of morphing malware to prevent a malware variant size
from “growing too fast” as its code gets morphed. A number of methods can be
used to have some control over the increase in the sizes of the successive
descendants for a given variant. One way of doing this, in the context of
probabilistic instruction-susbtituting malware, is to assign low rule application
probabilities to rules that increase the size of the variant being transformed. Higher
rule application probabilities would be assigned to rules transforming a single
instruction into another single instruction. The IA-32 instruction set is rich enough
to allow for a large number of rules (such as the fourth rule in Figure 5.1) mapping
an instruction to an equivalent but syntactically diﬀerent instruction.
77CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
6.1. Research Outcomes
The following contributions have been made in this dissertation.
Good design practices of morphing malware were identiﬁed. Engine eﬃciency,
non-deterministic computation, high engine-friendliness of malware variants, and
high friendliness preservation of morphing engines were identiﬁed as required
properties of malware to achieve its ultimate goals of evading fast detection.
A formal model of morphing malware was proposed. A model of morphing malware
was introduced. This model is intended to be more “realistic” than existing ones, in
particular that of Cohen [12]. Cohen’s computing machine, on which a virus
“propagates,” is simply regarded as eﬃcient non-deterministic software; it is treated
as a morphing engine and explicitly required to satisfy what we determined are the
good design practices of morphing malware (GDPs). In particular, the malware’s
morphing engine is required to run in polynomial time and be nondeterministic. A
virus for Cohen’s machine is treated as a malware variant that must have the
“engine-friendliness” attribute that is typically required of morphing malware and
that simply reﬂects the transformability of the malware code by the engine. This
model and the rationale behind it were presented in detail in Section 3.3. .Exact engine-speciﬁc recognition was shown to be computationally diﬃcult. It was
shown that, for any positive integer n and morphing engine M, decision of the set of
n
th-generation descendants of M is NP-complete. This was done by proving that
Boolean satisﬁability is reducible to the problem of answering the question “For a
ﬁxed engine M and a positive integer n, is program v
  an n
th-generation
M-descendant of program v?” in deterministic polynomial time. It was also shown
that the problem “Suppose we are given a signature σM of a code inserting
GDP-implementing morphing engine M, a program P, and a well-deﬁned method
for extracting σM from any given program. Does P contain the signature of M?” is
NP-complete.
Given a full understanding of the operation of the morphing engine of malware
implementing GDPs, a number of engine-speciﬁc tools approximating the above
decision problems were proposed and evaluated.
Density with engine ﬁngerprints was proposed and then used as an approximation to
DENSITYM. An important requirement of GDPs asks that any morphing malware
variant be highly transformable by the malware’s morphing engine. A na¨ ıve
measure was proposed, implemented, and then used to discriminate, in a large
sample of programs, variants of W32.Evol from non-variants.
Induced instruction-form distribution was proposed and used as an approximation to
GEN
n
M. GDPs call for morphing engines to assign higher probabilities of
application to preferred morphing transformations. It was hence suggested that,
79given a “full” understanding of a morphing engine and the probability with which it
makes its choices, one might be able to predict, at least to a certain degree, the
average instruction distribution for each generation of the descendants of any given
malware variant using that engine. First, a procedure was constructed that builds,
using only the engine, a transition matrix representing the evolution process of the
instruction frequency vectors of the variants as they evolve. Next, established
theorems from Markov chain theory [46] were applied that (1) give suﬃcient
conditions for convergence of a malware’s transition matrix towards a steady state
and (2) enable the probability distribution of the instruction-frequency vectors of
any generation of descendants of some probabilistic instruction-substituting
malware to be predicted. Finally, a na¨ ıve prediction algorithm was proposed which
extracts, given a malware variant and the full description of its
instruction-substituting engine’s probabilistic productions, the expected average
instruction frequency vector for each generation of descendants of that variant. The
approach was successfully used to ﬁlter out, from a large set of programs,
descendants of a W32.Evol variant from arbitrary programs.
6.2. Directions for Further Work
6.2.1.Fuzzy Logic
Expert malware analysts are quite good at determining (usually in a matter of
hours) what to use as a signature for a given malware. Typically, however, two
diﬀerent analysts may each generate diﬀerent signatures for a given variant. In this
80section we propose that a set of guidelines based on fuzzy logic theory [51] be
constructed to determine what set of properties commonly found among morphing
engines might be useful to suﬃciently well decide membership in the variant set of a
given morphing engine.
Metric Objective Measure
O1 Presence of a speciﬁc code marker
O2 Average instruction form distribution
O3 Average LOC
Table 6.1. Set of objective measures.
A set of objective metrics for the recognition of the variant set of the Evolve
engine is given in Table 6.1. These measures capitalize on the engine friendliness of
W32.Evol’s variants and the probabilistic nature of W32.Evol’s engine; O2 and O3
are generation-speciﬁc measures whose values vary depending on the particular
generation of descendants of a given Eve. This particular type of engine signature is
elaborated upon in detail in Chapter 5.
A set of fuzzy logic metrics for the recognition of the variant set of W32.Evol’s
engine is given in Table 6.2. The values of these metrics are in general undecidable,
especially when transformability is dependent upon program analysis. These
measures capitalize on the high engine-friendliness of malware variants and the high
friendliness preservation of a morphing engine. These variables might take on
integer values between 0 and 5, 0 being “very low” and 5 being “very high.”
81Metric Fuzzy Variable Measure Values
F1 Density with engine-inserted segments 0 to 5
F2 Density with transformable instruction 0 to 5
F3 Density with transformable code segments 0 to 5
F4 Register eax is never live directly after
each push eax instruction
0o r1
Table 6.2. Set of fuzzy variable measures.
6.2.2.Distribution Prediction
The proposed method for recognizing descendants of a malware variant using the
IFV transition matrix of its engine is limited to probabilistic
instruction-substituting malware.
We are currently investigating the possibility of extending the approach to
general probabilistic morphing where arbitrary probabilistic transformations are
employed by a morphing engine. It may be possible to capture the evolution of the
instruction frequency vectors of this type of malware as it transforms its own code.
6.2.3.A Probabilistic Machine Authorship Model of Malware
The probabilistic aspects of natural text generation are well understood and widely
accepted by the authorship analysis community [49]. Even when the author of a
given document does not conciously use the language of probability to generate the
document, the nature of the language itself that the document is written in has
tended to exhibit probabilistic dependencies among syntactic elements of the
document. One rather simple, and surprisingly successful, approach for authorship
analysis of English text has been devised by Khmelev and Tweedie [50] to determine
82who, among a set of authors, is more likely than the others to have produced a
document.
Strong probabilistic dependencies among the elements of the assembly language
representation of an engine-authored program may also exist, especially in the
context of a ﬁxed, closed-world, malware-generating engine with a ﬁnite number of
possible code segments it can possibly write at any given location in an output
program. Each segment being a sequence of instructions, we expect non-random
pairwise dependencies to form among the instructions of a program generated by
such an engine. Khmelev’s and Tweedie’s approach may hence be applicable in the
context of attributing malicious programs to their generating engine.
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ABSTRACT
A morphing malware is malicious software that uses a code morphing program, or
morphing engine, to transform its own code into a morphed variant. The goal of
this transformation is to evade recognition by malware detectors. This dissertation
proposes and evaluates a new method for detecting morphed malware variants. The
method uses information about the morphing engine to recognize variants created
by that engine. In particular, it is shown that implementation of the requirements
of good design practices of morphing malware can be capitalized upon to eﬃciently
discriminate programs generated by a morphing engine implementing these
requirements from programs that have not been generated by the engine. Exact
recognition techniques implementing this method are proposed and shown to be
computationally costly. Approximate eﬃcient variations on these techniques are
then proposed and successfully evaluated to recognize programs generated by a real
world morphing engine, W32.Evol. Finally, the variation of a malware’s instruction
distribution underlying a probabilistic morphing engine is modeled as a Markov
chain. Techniques from Markov chain theory are suggested to enable the use, for
detection purposes, of the distribution of the instruction-frequency vectors of thevarious generations of variants of morphed malware generated by a probabilistic
morphing engine.
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